“Maximum pressure” ought to mean “maximum pressure.” Yet despite sanctions and war, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s oil exports continued to surge in the first six months of 2025.
No doubt, U.S. economic penalties and Israeli strikes severely dented Tehran’s missile, military, and nuclear capabilities. But if Washington is serious about dismantling Iran’s nuclear weapons program and rolling back the spectrum of threats the regime poses according to President Trump’s national security memorandum, more will be needed, and quickly.
According to data available for purchase from Tankertrackers, Iran exported nearly 1.7 million barrels per day in June 2025 of crude oil, condensates, and fuel oil, resulting in a total of more than 50 million barrels worth an estimated $3.6 billion. These revenues will be used to fund oppression at home and aggression abroad, as well as to rebuild Iran’s shattered air defenses, missile capacity, and terror networks.
In February, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent pledged to reduce Tehran’s oil exports to nearly zero. That has not happened yet.
Tehran’s recorded oil exports under Trump 2.0 consistently exceed the levels recorded at the end of the Biden administration in January 2025. From February to June 2025, Iran averaged 1.67 million barrels per day in crude oil exports, 37 percent higher than the January 2025 figure. When including condensates and fuel oil, Tehran’s total export average for the February to June period increases to 1.84 mbpd, reflecting a 30 percent rise compared to January 2025. This stands in stark contrast to the maximum pressure period during Trump’s first term, when average oil exports hovered around 800,000 barrels per day, with some months dropping as low as 300,000.
Maximum pressure was so effective in Trump’s first term that Iran’s president and oil minister claimed that the sanctions were more damaging to oil exports than the Iran-Iraq War had been in the 1980s. No officials are making these claims today.
Last month, Iran exported a total of 50 million barrels of oil, around 1.7 mbpd, with 88 percent being crude oil, 10 percent fuel oil, and 2 percent condensates. Over 92 percent of these exports were destined for China while 6 percent went to the United Arab Emirates.
Nearly 80 percent of these shipments came from the oil export terminal at Kharg Island, which continued operating during the 12-Day War. In fact, despite a few symbolic strikes against energy depots and refineries, Israel largely avoided striking Iran’s major oil and gas production and export facilities.
Moreover, preliminary data from the first half of July indicates that Iranian oil exports are recovering from a slight decline in June, reaching nearly 2 mbpd with 1.8 mbpd being crude oil. The primary destinations for these exports are China and the United Arab Emirates, both of which were jurisdictions featuring major sanctions violations in Trump’s first term.
The reasons for Iran’s continued export capacity are many. Beyond Iran’s evolving sanctions-busting capabilities, Washington’s insistence on a deal throughout 2025 incentivized illicit shippers and buyers to stay in the sanctions-busting game, assuming a deal may be close.
Additionally, Washington has taken a graduated approach toward maximum pressure, focused on expanding the scope of Iran’s illicit oil export operations to include its “shadow fleet,” smaller Chinese private refiners, front companies and “shadow banking” networks financing these sales. A brief alleged “pause” in Iran sanctions enforcement, as first reported by the Wall Street Journal in June, may have also played a role.
Thus far, Treasury has not targeted major banks and ports, particularly in China, that are implicated in this illicit trade. A congressionally mandated report from the Biden administration identified 27 countries involved in Iran’s illegal oil trade. Data from June 2025 indicates that major ports in Fujairah, Jebel Ali, Zhoushan, Taicang, Qingdao, and Changzhou are part of this network.
The U.S. Treasury could expand its list of targets to include major ports, banks, and any firms involved in this illicit trade, particularly those with an international presence. Washington can also designate board members, C-suite level executives, shareholders, and ultimate beneficial owners.
But lawfare is only one component of economic statecraft. To effectively take-down Tehran’s oil export network as part of a comprehensive strategy against the Islamic Republic, the U.S. will need to leverage all elements of national power.
For example, the U.S. Navy could significantly increase its efforts to seize tankers transporting Iranian oil. Additionally, covert operations could target those who defy sanctions, focusing on the most egregious offenders. This will send an unambiguous message: the cost of doing business with Iran has escalated dramatically, and the consequences will be severe.
For Trump to achieve his policy goals and Bessent to fulfill his promise, the cost of doing business with Iran must be raised. Otherwise, they risk replicating the failed Biden-era approach to sanctioning Iran.
Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior advisor on Iran and financial economics at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington DC, where Behnam Ben Taleblu is the senior director of the Iran program.
