There is a reason the Kremlin does not want the U.S. military or NATO forces on the ground in Ukraine as a security guarantee. It is that they would significantly inhibit future Russian military operations against Kyiv.
For that reason alone, Western boots on the ground are the only security guarantee (short of NATO accession) that can ensure allied commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty and deter further Russian aggression.
As NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte stated last week in Kyiv, “Ukrainian guarantees should be such that Putin, sitting in Moscow, would never think of attacking Ukraine again.” That requires skin in the game, not support from the peanut gallery. Boots on the ground is the only deterrent Russia will respect. Moscow’s adamant rejection of this proposal is proof enough.
Russia does not get a vote. Boots on the ground would be a significant concession imposed upon Moscow, despite what Vice President JD Vance said on NBC News’ “Meet the Press” on Sunday. America and Europe must be their brother’s keeper.
The White House and Brussels must acknowledge that Russia’s goal is the systematic and complete destruction of Ukraine and the eradication of its culture. Every demand and alleged concession Putin makes is geared toward achieving that end-state. The Kremlin is setting conditions for future operations by removing obstacles. The Russian track record is clear — look no further than its actions in the Chechnya War.
Ukraine learned from the failed 1994 Budapest Memorandum that security guarantees not written into a legally binding treaty, with specific ironclad commitments, are not worth the paper they are printed on.
Russia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. made security guarantees to Ukraine in the Budapest Memorandum. The signatories agreed to “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.” Furthermore, they “reaffirm[ed] their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons [would] ever be used against Ukraine.”
Yet that guarantee failed Ukraine in Feb. 2014, and then again in Feb. 2022, when Putin invaded Crimea and then mainland Ukraine.
Now, 11 years later, NATO Article Five-like security guarantees have been proposed to Ukraine as part of an effort to encourage President Volodymyr Zelensky to consider a peace agreement with Russia.
The conditions would involve meeting Putin’s requirements: ceding all of the Donbas region in Eastern Ukraine, freezing the frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts in Southeastern Ukraine, renouncing aspirations to join NATO, committing to neutrality, and not allowing Western troops in the country.
The problem is, no one knows what “Article Five-like” security guarantees would look like.
Article Five states that “an armed attack against one or more [NATO members] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” To that end, NATO members agree that “if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties.”
How NATO accomplishes that without putting “boots on the ground” is the $64,000 question.
Last week, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni proposed a NATO-lite guarantee for Ukraine — committing Kyiv’s allies, under bilateral security agreements, to “decide within 24 hours whether to provide military support to Ukraine if it’s again attacked by Russia.” Meloni describes the proposal as a “NATO-like collective defense clause [that] doesn’t come with actual membership in the alliance.”
Easier said than done. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, it did so with 190,000 troops along multiple avenues of approach. What size force would be required to defend Ukraine? Who would plan, coordinate, and synchronize the defense? Would Ukraine be divided into zones with each contributing country responsible for the defense of their zone — like the partition of Berlin after World War II?
As Rutte recently told Fox News, “All the details have to be hammered out.” But by whom? The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who commands NATO Allied Command Operations, is an American four-star general who also happens to command the U.S. European Command. By default, the U.S. would remain in the lead.
The decision to provide military support to Ukraine must be made before Russia attacks — not 24 hours after. A Fulda Gap-like defense would need to be established — with defensive positions prepared and ammunition prepositioned to sustain combat operations. NATO countries contributing military forces would need formations on a persistent state of alert along the Ukrainian border, or from military bases within Ukraine.
Without boots on the ground, a decision to come to Ukraine’s defense 24 hours after Russia attacks would no longer be a defense but a movement to contact. Air superiority would have to be a precondition — meaning combat air patrols similar to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission providing air defense and close air support for ground forces.
Questions abound. Would contributing NATO countries unilaterally decide within 24 hours to directly engage Russian ground forces? And could they respond in a timely manner? The answer is likely no. The difficult and right decision must be made prior to a second Russian invasion, or else the easy and wrong decision will be made when it happens. Standing shoulder to shoulder must be an actuality, not a metaphor, and European voters are increasingly opposed to any deployment that places troops in harm’s way.
Although Trump has stated the U.S. will not put boots on the ground, the Pentagon has said it is “prepared to contribute strategic enablers, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, command and control and air defense assets to enable any European-led deployment on the ground.”
But that requires a plan. As Brussels struggles to develop that plan, Russia continues to bomb Ukrainian cities with ballistic missiles and drones, while making incremental advances further into Ukraine.
Peace in Ukraine cannot be done on the cheap. The attraction of NATO Article Five-like security guarantees is a fallacy.
The West needs to get Putin to stop attacking — and that means actually doing something, not conceding to more Russian demands. A forcing function — pulling the trigger on the sanctions bill and getting Ukraine the weapon systems they need to win — is the only viable way to change Putin’s cost calculus.
Col. (Ret.) Jonathan Sweet served 30 years as an Army intelligence officer. Mark Toth writes on national security and foreign policy.
